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Published quarterly by Unesco Vol. Explorer mm '. Sathyamurthy G. Benko Jacques Lombard Editorial General analyses The scientific status of the social sciences Philosophical schools and scientific working methods what kind of food can you buy with p-ebt card social science Value as a factor in social action Commodification of the social sciences Disciplines The social sciences and the study of international relations The institutionalization of sociology in France: its social and political significance Geography in the late twentieth century: n e w roles for a threatened discipline The social science sphere Development research and the social sciences in India Regional science: evolution over thirty years The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study Books received Recent Unesco publications ' eationale - Editorial There are ways in which scientific activity resembles the practice of a sport.
A sports- m a n must observe his movements and analyse them in detail, in order to improve his performance. Similarly, the researcher should not overlook professional self-analysis and reflection about the direction and scope of his work, finding theoretical and methodological ways to improve what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science results and better domi- nate his subject.
Indeed, this type of analysis cannot be isolated from what does mean in english activity itself. This is of particular importance in the case of the what is a functional dependency of m a n and society, where the re- lations between the researcher and his field of research present certain special characteristics different from those prevailing in the sciences of life and nature.
H o w e v e rthe epistemo- lógica! T h e theory of knowledge siynificance oppor- tunities for a refreshing look at the social sciences, provided that the Charybdis of obsessive preoccupation with epistemology is avoided as clearly as the Scylla of a narrow- minded empiricism. T h e articles in sivnificance issue are devoted, to such a self-examination of politcal social sciences, and present viewpoints on certain of their epistomological, axiological and institutional aspects.
Ernest Gellner raises the question of ascertaining whether the social sciences should be admitted into the exclusive club of the sciences. C a n the social world be studied scientifically, or should it be left to the philosophers and poets? Gellner has no ready- m a d e answer to offer, but he eloquently demonstrates the weakness of attempts to exclude the social sciences from the scientific realm.
Stefan N o w a k broaches the relations between the scientific methods used in socio- logy sicence various philosophical schools and shows h o w methodological choices indicate philosophical and epistemological prefer- ences. Emérita Quito's contribution analyses the relations between values as an object to be studied, and values as factors influencing social science research. Claude A k e offers an approach that could be called a rationaale economy of the social sciences, showing what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science the latter, operating under the constraints of market laws and within an environment domi- nated by exchange value and not use value, are commodified.
T h e last three articles of the thematic section are epistemological analyses of specific disciplines in various contexts. E d m u n d Burke III studies the social and economic forces that ratiobale the institutional- ization of sociology in France, at the turn of the century, Philippe Braillard discusses the case of international relations, and Milton Santos, that of geography. Sathyamurthy describes the striking growth of the social sciences anthropologyy post-independence India; G. B e n k o writes about socology science, an interdisciplinary field that has developed over the last few Editorial decades; and Jacques Lombard provides a his- torical account of the teaching of anthro- pology in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Cannot map network drive vpn, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
XXII, N o. The complete list of back issues is provided at the end of this volume. W e take this opportunity to inform our different kinds of evolutionary trees of a recent change in the editorial team. Peter Lengyel, editor of this Journal sincehas left Unesco, which he joined in His career in the service of the Organization, devoted to m a n y zociology of international co-operation in the social sci- ences, was characterized above all by his achievements with the ISSJ.
W h a t is it to be scientific? T h e first of these questions raises no deep problems and can be answered by ostensión or by enumeration. T h e social sciences simply are what social scientists professionally practise. The definition thus con- tains a covert but hardly very covert reference to the consensual or m a -jority or uncontested judgements rationwle in contemporary societies and identifying, by their tacit or express ranking, which universities, pro- fessional associations, individuals, are as it were norm-setting or paradig- matic ajd, in effect, de- Ernest Gellner, formerly at the Lon- don School of Economics and Poli- tical Science, is now Professor of Anthropology at King's College, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
This covert reference to public opinion or consensus does not vitiate the definition or m a k e it circular. Majorities, consensus, the general cultural 'sense of the meeting'—all these are of course not infallible or stable or unambiguous. There is no contradiction in the suggestion that public opinion at aignificance given date is in error.
If such sources can be mistaken, could they mislead us in this case, by falsely identifying the object, or cluster of objects, with which w e are to be concerned, namely the social sciences? T h e central object of our inquiry is precisely the social sciences, as actually practised and identified in contem- porary societies. Public opinion, however what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science defined, cannot here mislead us, because the object that concerns us is, pre- cisely, one defined by reference to current cultural norms.
W e m a y of course also be in- terested in s o m e trans- social, culturally neutral, ideal social science, if there is such a thing; but our primary concern is with the concrete prac- tices recognized currently as 'social sciences'. But the situation is quite different w h e n w e c o m e to the second term, which needs to be de- fined—'scientific'. Hereostensión or enumeration are of no help whatever. W e are not specially interested in the question of o society happens to call 'scientific', or at any rate, the actual use of this label by our contemporaries is not conclusive.
A s a matter of fact, what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science is disunited on this issue, and there is a lot of very significant pushing and pulling going on about just h o w far the blanket of the trang phục smart casual là gì is to reach.
But w e are not interested in holding a referendum about this, or in seeing which of Ernest Gellner the m a n y warring groups manages to impose its view at any given time. Instead, w e are deeply concerned with s o m e normative, genu- inely authoritative sense of 'scientific'. W e are interested in finding out whether the social sciences are really scientific.
This is in itself an interesting and sig- nificant fact. In formulating our question— A r e the social sciences scientific? T h e rules of its application are meant to be based on s o m e higher, independent authority. O u r sentence thus seems logically a hybrid—the subject is nominalistic or conven- tional, the predicate is Platonistic, essentialist and prescriptive. Is such double-talk per- what is a dynamic nurse-patient relationship I do not think this situation is actu- ally all that anomalous or unusual.
But it is significant. If both terms were defined convention- ally, by reference to the actual or majority or agreed use of the term, the question would be easy to answer and lack any profundity or importance. All w e should need to do would be to commission a survey, set up to find out whether and to what extent people use one label 'social sciences' in a manner such that it falls within the range of use of another and broader label 'scientific'.
But no such survey would in fact be felt to be relevant, or at any rate conclusive, to the question which w e are effectively asking. Note that it is an old and pervasive feature of discussions concerning the delimi- tations of 'science' or 'meaning'. Those famous demarcation disputes had all the passion and intensity of circumscribing the saved and the damnedof defining the licit and the illicit, of discovering an important and given truth, and not of just allocating labels.
Conventionalism with respect to the de- limitation of concepts was only invoked, with some embarrassment and visible lack of con- viction, w h e n the theorist found himself cor- nered by, for instance, the insistent question concerning the status of the 'verification principle' itself. W a s it itself an experiential report, or a convention determining the limits of a term? The pretence was maintained that the verifiability demarcation of meaning or of science was merely a convention of ours.
But the real spirit in which this delimitation was proposed was obviously quite different. It was propounded as an objective, authoritative, Platonic norm. It circumscribed cognitive salvation. There is not a shadow of doubt that discussions concerning what is and is not 'scientific' are carried on in this utterly Pla- tonistic, normative and non-conventionalist spirit. These are debates about whether something is really, really scientific.
T h e debates seem based on the assumption what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science what is what is systematic random sampling with example issue is an important conceptual boundary, in the very nature of things, and altogether beyond the reach of what w e choose to call what. Another explanation is available: w e are not conceptually rigid because w e are Pla- tonists; w e become Platonists because w e are conceptually rigid.
It is w h e n concepts con- sfience us, that w e turn Platonist malgré nous. W e cannot always choose our concepts, and our concepts do often have authority over us. M a n can do as he will, but he cannot will as he will; and he cannot always choose his concepts at will. Sometimes they have an authority over us rationalf e cannot resist. A n d w h y are w e in s o m e cases so conceptually rigid, and w h y do w e allow ourselves to be bonds- m e n to the values and imperatives incapsu- lated in s o m e ideas?
Generically, one m a y say rhe this hap- pens because some cluster or syndrome ofThe scientific status of the social sciences features, locked in with each polirical in this or that concept of a given language or style of thought, has good reasons, so to speak, for being locked in with each other in just that manner, with that particular set of ingredi- ents, and for having some kind of compul- sive hold over our thought.
Moreover, the moral charge, positive or how many days of talking before dating, with which such concepts are loaded, cannot be prised away from them. The reasons that lead to the crystallization of such concepts binding a cluster of traits m a y be general or specific; they m a y be inherent in the h u m a n condition as such, or they m a y be tied to some definite social or historic situation.
But the overall formula for this occurrence must be some- thing like this: situations arise and some- times persist which impel a given speech and conceptual community to think in terms of a concept T, defined in terms of attributes, a, b, c, etc. So is its moral charge. S o m e conceptual boundaries have an importance for given societies, which arises from the very nature of their situation, and which cannot be abrogated by fiat.
There is no doubt in m y mind that, in modern society, the concept of the 'scientific' is precisely of this kind. W e need it, and it cannot but be an important and authoritative notion. A s so often, w e m a y or m a y not be able to specify precisely what it is that w e m e a n by it; what m a y be called Socrates' paradox, namely that it is possible to use a notion without being able to define it, does apply here, as it does so often.
But whatever it is that goes into the cluster of traits which defines the idea, the idea is indisputably important, and is so to speak non-optional. W e do not k n o w precisely what it is, but w e do k n o w that it is important and that whst e can'not tinker sihnificance it at will. The idea of the 'scientific' is such a notion. But it has not always been so. N o doubt it has some mild affinity with the old desire to define true knowledge as against mere opinion, and with the even m o r e acute concern with the identification of anthtopology true faith.
In the latter case, w e k n e w only too well w h y the notion was so important: personal salvation and damnation depended on it. But the demarcation of the scientific, though it m a y overlap, certainly is not co-extensivè let alone co-intensive with either true knowl- edge or with the true faith. If this be granted, then what is it? Sociologizing science to the second degree: Popper and Kuhn T h e 'scientific' has not been a crucial and authoritative notion in politiical ages and all so- cieties.
In societies in which the institution of the what is the significance and rationale of studying sociology anthropology and political science was well established, it was natural that the preoccupation with the distinction be- count blessings not problems meaning in hindi real and spurious knowledge, genuine and fraudulent access to recipes for good life- styles and excellence, should become wide- spread.
It was a kind of consumer studykng service for those w h o entered the market- place for wisdom and counsellor services about the 'good life'; and it seemed to provide the first powerful stimulus for the develop- ment of the theory of knowledge. In the days of competing putative messiahs, the criteria for identifying the true one seemed to be demonstratively spectacular rather than epis- temological. B y the time Revelation came to be monopolized and scripturally codified, the central preoccupation became, naturally, the identification of the unique soiology nearly unique point of revelation, and of the authenticity of the putatively unique message, messenger, or of the permanent institution or series of personal links between the authentic point of can long distance relationship last and the present.
Against the background of these various institutional and doctrinal assumptions, each of these ques- tions, and no doubt other variants of them, m a d e sense. Although they do have some overlap and affinity with the question that concerns us here, obviously they are how to add affiliate links identical with it. The main point of overlap is that in all of Ernest Gellner these questions, m e n were concerned with the validation it is used to establish the cause and effect relationship of variables brainly legitimation of more specific claims, in terms of some more general cri- teria.
W h e n one determines whether or not something is 'scientific', one is ipso facto deciding whether or not it has a certain legitimate claim on our attention, and perhaps even on our credence. T h e status of being 'scientific' is not necessarily the only or the dominant way of conferring such authority on specific claims; but it is most certainly at least one a m snd n g such widely heeded and respected ways of validation.
This, to m poolitical mind, is a crucial clue.
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