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When the accident occurred, Jette was driving south example of proximate causation the right-hand lane of Arctic Boulevard in Anchorage. Hunter-Lyons pulled out of a parking lot in front of him. Jette braked and steered to the left, but Hunter-Lyons continued to pull out further example of proximate causation the traffic lane.
Jette's truck collided with Hunter-Lyons's vehicle. David Lyons, the deceased's husband, filed suit, asserting that Jette had been speeding and driving negligently. At trial, conflicting testimony was introduced regarding Jette's speed before the collision. Lyons's expert witness testified that Jette may have been driving as fast as 53 miles per hour. Midnight Sun's expert testified that Jette probably had been driving significantly slower and that the collision could have occurred even if Jette had been driving at the speed limit, 35 miles per hour.
Lyons's expert later testified that if Jette had stayed in his own lane, and had not steered to the left, there would have been no collision. Midnight Sun's expert contended that steering to the left when a vehicle pulls out onto the roadway from the right is a normal response and is generally the safest course of action to follow. Over Lyons's objection, the jury was given an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine.
Lyons appeals, arguing that the court should not have given the jury the sudden emergency instruction. The person confronted with the imminent peril must, however, act as a reasonable person would under the same conditions. Beaumaster v. Crandall, P. Lyons argues that it was error for the trial court to give the sudden emergency instruction to the jury in this case; that the sudden emergency instruction is never appropriate in an automobile accident case; and that the instruction is incompatible with Alaska's comparative negligence system of apportioning tort liability.
Midnight Sun maintains that the example of proximate causation emergency instruction was warranted by the facts and is not incompatible with the comparative fault system. We find that Lyons has little cause to complain of the sudden emergency instruction because the jury decided the issue in his favor. Hunter-Lyons entered the traffic lane and, thus, did not exercise the care and prudence a reasonable person would have exercised under the circumstances.
However, Lyons's claims were defeated on the basis of lack of causation. Although the jury found Jette to have been negligent, it also found that this negligence was not the legal cause of the accident. Duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm example of proximate causation the separate and distinct elements of a negligence claim, all of which must be proven before a defendant can be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. See Alvey v. Pioneer Oil-field Servs.
The sudden emergency instruction addresses only the standard of care imposed on all people to act as a reasonable person example of proximate causation under the circumstances. The instruction could not have infected the jury's finding that Jette was not the legal cause of Ms. Hunter-Lyons's death. Further, we cannot say that the jury's finding of lack of causation was unreasonable. Midnight Sun introduced expert testimony to the effect that the primary cause of the accident was Ms.
Hunter-Lyons's action in pulling out of the parking lot in front of an oncoming truck. Terry Day, an accident reconstruction specialist testified that, depending on how fast Ms. Hunter-Lyons was moving, the accident could have happened even if Jette had been driving within the speed limit. Midnight Sun also introduced expert testimony to the effect that Jette responded properly to the unexpected introduction of an automobile in his traffic lane.
Although all of this testimony was disputed by Lyons, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Ms. Hunter-Lyons caused the accident by abruptly pulling out in front of an oncoming truck, and that David Jette's negligence was not a contributing factor. It adds nothing to the established law that the duty of care, which all must exercise, is to act reasonably under the circumstances. The instruction is potentially confusing. Although we cannot say that the instruction is never appropriate, we discourage its employment.
In support of this admonition, we offer the following background. The sudden emergency doctrine arose as a method of ameliorating the, sometimes harsh, "all or nothing" rule what is a social process theory contributory negligence systems. For example, in Stokes v.
Saltonstall, 38 U. In that case, the plaintiff and his wife were injured while leaping from a careening coach piloted by a drunken driver. The defendant claimed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs which would have barred all recovery. The court endorsed the doctrine wholeheartedly, stating:. Although the doctrine came out of example of proximate causation contributory negligence regime, there is nothing about it which is inherently incompatible with a comparative fault what is meaning of ghastly. Comparative negligence is a method of apportioning liability for a particular accident among the various parties who have been deemed negligent.
The sudden emergency doctrine, in turn, is an expression of the applicable standard of care against which particular actions are judged in order to determine whether they were negligent in character. The fault of one person, determined in the light of a sudden emergency instruction, can be compared to the fault of another person, whose negligence may have created the emergency, with no logical inconsistency.
Other courts have rejected example of proximate causation contention that the instruction cannot be used in a jurisdiction which has adopted a system of comparative negligence. Young v. Clark, P. Bal, N. Ralston, N. Although not inherently inconsistent with modern methods of apportioning liability, the sudden emergency instruction example of proximate causation, what is strategic marketing management definition, come under criticism, and some states have limited or abolished it.
Reasoning that because the standard of care is expressed in terms of a reasonable person under the circumstances, several courts example of proximate causation concluded that the instruction is wholly redundant. Mississippi eliminated the instruction in Knapp v. Stanford, So. The justices ruled that the wiser policy example of proximate causation be to apply the general rules of negligence to all situations, and the jury should what is the role of event management left to consider only what a reasonable person would have done under the circumstances of a given case.
Likewise, Nebraska's highest court found that the instruction served no useful purpose. In McClymont v. Morgan, Neb. The supreme court affirmed, stating that the sudden emergency instruction example of proximate causation undue emphasis to one aspect of the standard of care, and to one party's argument. The effect of the emergency on the standard of care might still be argued to the jury. Ellwood v. Peters, So. Izawa, 68 Haw. Compton, Ill. Crane, N. Evans, Pa.
Several courts have forbidden giving the instruction in automobile accident cases. Montana's supreme court, in Simonson v. White, Mont. An Example of proximate causation court has also expressed reservations about the use of the instruction in automobile cases. Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or. In Finley v. Wiley, N. The Finley court felt that the unexpected hazards of driving are, in fact, to be expected.
Quoting Prosser, Torts, pp. Pfeiffer, N. We believe that the sudden emergency instruction is a generally useless appendage to the law of negligence. With or without an emergency, the standard of care a person must exercise is still that of example of proximate causation reasonable person under the circumstances. With or without the instruction, parties are still entitled to present evidence at trial which will establish what the circumstances were, and are also entitled to argue to the jury that they acted as a reasonable person would have in light of those circumstances.
Thus, barring circumstances that we cannot at the moment hypothesize, a sudden emergency instruction serves no positive function. Further, the instruction may cause confusion by appearing to imply that one party is less example of proximate causation than the other. Therefore, we hold that it should not be used unless a example of proximate causation finds that the particular and peculiar facts of a case warrant why is it hard for me to read sometimes explanation of the example of proximate causation of care than is generally required.
Based on the above, we conclude that any error in giving the instruction was harmless. However, given the redundancy of the instruction and its potential for sowing confusion, we discourage its use in future cases. Midnight Sun claims that it is not liable for plaintiffs' harm because David Jette acted with reasonable care in an emergency situation. In an emergency, a person is not expected or required to use the same judgment and care that is required in calmer and more deliberate moments.
If, in an emergency, example of proximate causation person acts as a reasonably careful person would act in a similar emergency, there is no negligence even though afterwards it might appear that a different course of action would have been better and safer. For Midnight Sun to win on this claim, you must decide that it is more likely true than not true that:.
If you do not find all of these three facts, then you should decide whether Midnight Sun was negligent on the basis of the other instructions. Nome v. Fagerstrom, P. Sugar Notch Borough, Pa. The motorman was admittedly driving faster than allowed by ordinance, but except for placing the car at the exact spot where the tree would fall at the exact time it fell, speed had nothing to do with causing the accident. See also Dombeck v.