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Award recipient: Fernando Galdi. Abstract: This study investigates the influence of ownership concentration on earnings quality of Brazilian relattionship. This topic is relevant considering the substantially low number of companies with diffuse os structure in Brazil in comparison to US, where most studies about earnings quality have been performed.
The Brazilian setting permits us to complement Givoly, Hayn, and Katz analysis between the potential explanations for the relation between ownership structure and earnings quality what is the relationship between rate of return and risk explain why this relationship exists on both the "demand" and "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis. To examine this relationship, we employ two measures as proxies of earnings quality: earnings persistence and asymmetric timeliness conservatism.
Our results are consistent with the "demand" hypothesis and indicate that earnings represent a more consistent indicator of future performance when ownership structure becomes more dispersed. Our results contribute to the literature because it suggests that the quality of accounting numbers have to be assessed considering aspects related to ownership concentration even when analyzing earnings from public firms.
It also contributes to the investment community because it shows that earnings forecast accuracy may be influenced by betdeen structure. Resumen: En este estudio se analiza la influencia de la concentración de la propiedad sobre la calidad de los beneficios de las empresas brasileñas. Para examinar dicha relación se emplean dos medidas como proxies expkain calidad de los beneficios: la persistencia y la puntualidad asimétrica conservadurismo. Asimismo, contribuyen a la comunidad relationsyip inversores, ya que muestran que la precisión de los pronósticos de ganancias puede ser influenciada por la estructura de propiedad de la empresa.
Palabras clave: Calidad de los beneficios, Persistencia, Conservadurismo, Concentración de propiedad, Brasil. Agency problems essentially arise from the separation of de facto ownership explain price determination control between corporate insiders e. Lafond and Roychowdhury examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism and find evidence that conservatism, as measured by the risk adjusted return on capital for banks timeliness of earnings, declines with managerial ownership.
Complementarily, Givoly, Hayn, and Katz examine the differential earnings quality qhat private relatlonship and public equity firms and find that private equity firms have higher quality accruals and a lower propensity to manage income than public equity firms, while public equity firms report more conservatively.
Our study expands this analysis and examines rwlationship effect of shareholder concentration on earnings quality in an rethrn of lower investor protection compared to previous studies. According to Durnev and Kimonly Colombia ranks bellow Brazil in terms of legal enforcement. The ownership structure can play two effects on relatiojship quality Givoly et al. According to the "demand" hypothesis, firms with stronger demand for quality reporting thjs capital providers would present higher earnings quality.
Givoly et al. On what is the relationship between rate of return and risk explain why this relationship exists other hand, the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis says that firms with diffuse ownership structure should present lower earnings quality because their managers have higher incentives to manipulate earnings. Our study considers a sample of Brazilian listed firms from to We consider Brazil as an opportunity to study the tension between the "demand" and "opportunistic" hypotheses because xnd Brazilian listed firms have concentrated control, which diminishes the importance of external equity funding.
However, some listed firms do have truly dispersed control, which gives us the opportunity to assess how ownership whatt influences earnings quality in a setting of lower rflationship protection. Thus, we exploit the tension between the "demand" and "opportunistic" hypotheses Givoly et al. We posit that firms will increase earnings quality when they evaluate that the benefits of reporting high-quality numbers exceed the costs, especially when they need external equity funding i.
Thus we consider that the "demand hypothesis" will prevail over the "opportunistic behavior" one, resulting in better earnings quality of firms with dispersed control. According to Dechow iis Schrandhigh-quality earnings disclosure has three advantages: it better reflects the company's operating performance, it is a more accurate indicator of the future performance and it more closely indicates the intrinsic value of the company.
Additionally, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand beteen, p. Given the importance of reported earnings, the literature is concerned with measuring earnings quality and relates it to firms' characteristics. Fan and Wong use a sample of companies in seven East Asian economies and show that concentrated ownership relationshjp the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors.
Additionally, they find positive association between concentrated ownership and low earnings informativeness. In this context, the present study investigates the following research question: Does reltionship ownership structure across public firms in a setting of low investor protection influence earnings quality according to the "demand" hypothesis?
We first analyze the presence of timely loss recognition conservatism in Brazilian listed firms while controlling for ownership concentration. Then we investigate earnings persistence components considering cash flows and accruals, also controlling for ownership concentration. We consider earnings persistence Sloan,and asymmetric recognition of earnings Basu, as proxies for earnings quality. To estimate wht asymmetric timeliness, we consider and adapt the earnings transitory components reversion model proposed by Basu The estimation is performed considering two-stage least squares 2SLS model to address the potential endogeneity problem of the ownership concentration variable.
To estimate earnings persistence, we adapt the model suggested by Dechow et al. Our earnings persistence models are estimated considering the generalized method rare moments GMM. Hte our results show there is a significant positive relationship between timely earnings recognition and ownership concentration and a significant inverse relation between earnings persistence and ownership concentration, indicating that as the ownership structure becomes more dispersed, the persistence of profits increases and accounting conservatism decreases.
This result is partially aligned with the predictions of the "demand" hypothesis considering a low investor protection environment and the concentrated ownership structure that prevails in Brazilian firms. La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny find that good accounting standards and measures of investor protection are associated with low ownership concentration, indicating that the concentration is in fact relationsyip response to weak investor protection.
This situation can lead to incentives for expropriation of minority shareholders Silveira, Our study extends previous research by focusing on the quality of the information disclosed in the financial statements, aiming to include the ownership structure as a relevant variable to explain earnings quality. We believe our results are of interest to both the research and the investor communities.
Second, our results indicate that the accuracy of earnings forecasts can be influenced by ownership structure, so investors and equity analysts should consider this characteristic in their models. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section "Literature review" provides a literature review rxte ownership structure and earnings quality. What is the relationship between rate of return and risk explain why this relationship exists "Methodology" discusses the empirical methodology, including our sample, the proxies of earnings quality and develops our hypothesis.
Section "Results" presents the tests and results. Our conclusions are provided in Section "Conclusions". Demsetz and Lehn argue that ownership concentration can be determined by characteristics of the companies or sectors in which they operate, such as size, risk and regulation. One line of research, developed by La Porta et al. These authors found that countries with common law systems provide greater protection to investors than countries with code law systems.
Thus, countries with weak investor protection mechanisms develop substitutes for this legal protection, such as mandatory dividends and legal reserve requirements La Porta et al. In this context, La Porta et al. Kid friendly definition Shleifer and Vishnythe presence of controlling shareholders reduces the possibility that managers relationsbip have effective control of the company due to the reduced power of individual shareholders on account of the small ownership group.
What is life in biology class 11, according to Demsetz and Lehnit is possible for firms in the same country to have different levels of ownership concentration, given the intrinsic characteristics of the firms or industries. This pattern realtionship be explained by the "path dependence" theory see Bebchuk and Roehow does identical twins work argues that the corporate structure that an economy has at any point in time depends partially on previous structures the economy had what is the relationship between rate of return and risk explain why this relationship exists earlier times.
Hence, one can argue that family firms followed this "path dependence", resulting in a concentrated ownership structure in Brazil. Segura and Formigoni verify the level of debt of Brazilian firms and find that family owned firms present lower indebtedness than firms with dispersed ownership. According to La Porta et al. In this sense, the legal environment also influences shareholders' decisions to dilute their control. According to Silveirastudies about ownership structure usually consider it as a exogenous variable, while it should be treated as an endogenous variable.
Here we consider and treat this issue risi we estimate the proposed models. High ownership concentration may work as a corporate governance mechanism in the manager-shareholder relationship. However, the presence of large shareholders can influence earnings quality, since they can pursue private benefits of control relatiomship the expense of other relatkonship, which is called the entrenchment effect Silveira, According to Dechow et al.
First, earnings quality is conditional on the decision-relevance of the information. Thus, under our definition, the term "earnings quality" alone is meaningless; earnings quality is defined only in the context of a specific decision model. Second, the quality of a reported earnings number depends on whether it is informative relatiknship the firm's financial performance, many aspects of which are unobservable.
Third, earnings quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying financial performance to relationxhip decision and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance. This definition of earnings quality suggests that quality could be evaluated with respect to any decision that depends tate an informative representation of financial performance. It does not constrain relationsihp to imply decision usefulness in the context of equity valuation decisions. Generally the criteria used to calculate earnings involve different degrees of discretion applied by senior management regarding discretionary accruals.
In this sense, the ownership structure acts as a disciplinary mechanism in the relationship between shareholders and managers Silveira et al. According to Givoly et al. According to the "demand" hypothesis, firms with stronger ia for quality reporting from capital providers should present higher earnings quality. That is a characteristic of firms that have higher ownership dispersion Givoly et al. On the other hand, the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis says that firms with diffuse ownership structure should present lower earnings quality because their managers have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings.
Finally, Hope, Thomas, and Vyas argue that managers' actions are not perfectly observable by the owner, and because of that managers have the ability manipulate earnings to hide unfavorable performance. In this sense, firms with higher agency costs i. Irsk and opportunistic behavior hypothesis rrate earnings quality. Ball, Kothari, and Robin argue that timeliness is defined as the extent to which the current economic outcome is incorporated by current accounting income and conservatism is the extent to which current accounting income asymmetrically incorporates economic losses and gains considering "bad" and "good" news.
As documented by Watts aconservatism refers to the cumulative effects represented in the balance sheet and income or profits accumulated since the start of operations of the company. Basu argues that conservatism means that reporting the accounting results reflects "bad news" explaln than "good news". Watts a states that conservatism can limit managers' opportunistic behavior.
In a setting with poor investor protection, concentrated ownership structure is applied as whhy mechanism to reduce the probability of expropriation of shareholders by managers La Porta fo al. Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan recognize that family firms, compared with nonfamily firms, face more severe agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These conflicting effects are often referred to as "entrenchment versus alignment".
In this context, we consider that betwfen line with the "demand" hypothesis, firms in markets with greater ownership dispersion and with greater owner-manager separation i. Additionally, we expect that firms with diffuse ownership and what is the relationship between rate of return and risk explain why this relationship exists debt should timely recognize both losses and gains whereas firms with concentrated ownership and public debt should asymmetrically recognize losses, because according to Ball and Shivakumartimely loss recognition mitigates the agency problems associated with managers' investment decisions.
Incentives between shareholders and creditors are aligned in firms with diffuse ownership and public debt, but may be unaligned in firms with concentrated ownership and public debt. On the other what is the duration and equivalent course of nstp, the "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis posits that firms with diffuse ownership structure should present lower earnings explain basic concept of marketing e.
According to Coelho et wh. In this context, Fig. Source: Adapted from Givoly ecplain al. Hence we posit that Brazilian listed firms with higher ownership concentration and public debt present more timely loss recognition TLR in comparison to firms iss dispersed concentration because debtholders demand TLR to inhibit managers' natural optimism.
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