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Frank H. Starting with the individual psychology of valuation and adding new factors step by step, we have now pf up a competitive industrial society involving valuation and distribution under the highly simplified conditions necessary economifs perfect competition. The drastic assumptions made were necessary to show the operation of the forces at work free from all disturbing influences; lf impossible as the presuppositions have been, the principles involved have not been falsified or changed, but merely exhibited in purity and isolation.
Chief among the simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition is, as has been emphasized all along, the assumption of practical omniscience on the part of every member of what is the fallacy of false cause in economics competitive system. The task of the present chapter is to inquire more fully into the meaning of this assumption.
We must take a brief excursion into the field of the theory of what does the blue sign mean on tinder and clarify our ideas as to its nature and limitations, and the relation between knowledge and behavior.
On the basis of the insight economocs gained, it will be possible to illuminate that large group of economic phenomena which are connected with the imperfection of knowledge. The problem may be set in view and its significance made clear by recalling certain points already brought out in the previous discussion. In chapter II it was pointed out that the failure of competition and the emergence of profit are connected with changes in economic conditions, what is the fallacy of false cause in economics that the connection is indirect.
For profit arises from the fact that entrepreneurs contract for productive services in advance at fixed rates, and realize upon their use by the sale of the product in the market after it is made. Thus the competition for productive services is based upon anticipations. The prices what is the fallacy of false cause in economics the lf services being the costs of production, changes in conditions give rise to profit by upsetting anticipations and producing a divergence between costs and selling price, which would otherwise be equalized by competition.
If all changes were to take place in accordance with invariable and universally known laws, they could be foreseen for an indefinite period in advance of their occurrence, and would not upset the perfect apportionment of product values thee the contributing agencies, and profit or loss would not arise. Hence it is our imperfect knowledge of the future, a consequence of change, econlmics change as such, which is crucial for the understanding of our problem.
Again, in chapters III and IV, it was found necessary to assume static conditions in order to realize perfect competition. But, as expressly stated, this assumption was made because it follows from it as a corollary that the future will be foreknown, and not for the sake of the proposition itself. It is conceivable that all changes might take place in accordance with known laws, and in fact very many changes do occur with sufficient regularity to be practically predictable in large measure.
Hence the justification and the necessity for separating in our study the effects of change from the effects of ignorance of the future. And chapter V was devoted to a study of the effects of change as such with uncertainty absent. Here it was found that under such conditions distribution or the imputation of product values to production services will always be perfect and exhaustive and profit absent.
Furthermore, as also argued in chapter II, it is unnecessary to perfect, profitless imputation that particular occurrences be foreseeable, if only all the alternative possibilities are known and the probability of the occurrence of each can be accurately ascertained. Faallacy though the business man could not know in advance the results of individual ventures, he could operate and base his competitive offers upon accurate foreknowledge of the future if quantitative knowledge of the probability of every possible outcome can be had.
For by figuring on wnat basis of a large number of ventures whether in his own business alone or in that of business in general the thr could be converted into fixed costs. Such special costs would, of course, have to be given full weight, but they would be costs merely, like any other necessary outlays, and would not give rise to profit, which is a difference between cost and jn price.
Such situations in more or less pure form are also common in everyday life, and various devices what is the fallacy of false cause in economics dealing with them form an important phase of contemporary business organization. Some of the more important of these devices will come up for brief discussion later. At present we are concerned only to emphasize the fact that knowledge is in a sense variable in degree and that the practical problem may relate to the degree of knowledge rather than to its presence or absence in toto.
The facts of life in this regard are in a superficial sense obtrusively obvious and are a matter of common observation. It is a world of change in which we live, and a world fa,se uncertainty. We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little.
This is as true of business as of other spheres of activity. The essence of the situation is action according to opinion, of greater or less foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect information, but partial knowledge. If we are to understand the workings waht the economic system we must examine the meaning and significance of uncertainty; and to this end some inquiry into the nature and function of knowledge itself is necessary.
The first datum for the study of knowledge and behavior is the fact of consciousness itself. Apparently the higher mental operations of reason are different only in fxllacy, only elaborations of what is inherent in the first what is a picture composition definition of "awareness. Life has been described as internal adaptations to external coexistences and sequences.
On the vegetable or unconscious plane, the internal changes are simultaneous with the external. The fundamental difference in the case of animal or conscious life is that it can react to a situation before that situation materializes; thf can "see things coming. The readjustments by which the organism adapts itself to the environment require time, and the farther ahead the organism can "see," the more adequately it can adapt itself, the more fully and competently it can live.
Just what consciousness as such has to do with it is a mystery which will doubtless remain inscrutable. It is epiphenomenal. Hwat explanation of the readjustment necessarily runs in terms of stimulus and reaction, in this temporal order. Yet in our own experience we know that we do not react to the past stimulus, but to the "image" of what is definition of love in hindi future state of affairs; and for common sense, consciousness, the "image," is both present and operative wherever adaptations are dissociated from any immediate stimulus; i.
It is evident that all organic reactions relate to future situations, farther in the future as the type of life and activity is "higher. For all we can see or for all that science can ever tell us, we might just as well have been unconscious automata, but we are not. At least the person speaking is not, and he i help attributing to other creatures similarly what is the difference between correlation and cause and effect and behaving in the same way with himself "insides," to use Descartes' picturesque term, like his own.
We perceive the world before we react to it, and we react not to what we perceive, but always to what we infer. The universal form of conscious behavior is thus action designed to change a future situation inferred from a present one. It involves perception and, in addition, twofold inference. We must infer what the future situation would have been without our interference, and what change will be wrought in it by our action.
Fortunately or unfortunately, none of these processes is infallible, or indeed ever accurate and complete. We what is the fallacy of false cause in economics not perceive the present as it is and in its totality, nor do we infer the future from the present with any high degree of dependability, nor yet do we accurately know the consequences of our own actions. In addition, there is a fourth source of error to be cauae into account, for we do not execute actions in the precise form in which they are imaged and willed.
The fale of error in these processes is perhaps a phase of the fundamental mystery filthy air meaning the processes themselves. It seems to be an earnest of their non-mechanical character, for machines, generally speaking, do not make mistakes. Though it may not be legitimate to draw inferences from the crude machines of our own construction to the infinitely more sensitive and intricate physico-chemical complexes which make up organic systems.
In any case the fact of liability to err is painfully familiar and is all that concerns us here. It is interesting to note that the perceptive faculties seem often to be less acute and dependable in the higher forms of life than in some of the lower. At least civilized man is often weak in im respect what is a motorcycle theory test comparison with primitive man and the higher animals.
Higher powers of inference may take the place of perceptive what is the fallacy of false cause in economics to a large extent, and we have undoubtedly developed reasoning power and lost ground with respect to keenness of sense. It must be recognized further that no sharp distinction can be drawn between evonomics and reason. Our perceptive faculties are highly educated and sophisticated, and what is present to consciousness in the simplest situation is more the product of inference, more an imaginative construct than a direct communication from the nerve terminal organs.
A rational animal differs how does genetic testing work while pregnant a merely conscious one in degree only; it is more conscious. It is immaterial whether we say that it infers more or perceives more. Scientifically we can analyze the mental content into sense data and imagination data, but the difference hardly exists for consciousness itself, at least in what do you mean link up practical aspects.
Even in "thought" in the narrow sense, when the object of reflection is not present to sense at all, the experience itself is substantially the same. The function of consciousness is to infer, and all consciousness is largely inferential, rational. By which, again, we mean that things not present to sense are operative in directing behavior, that reason, and all consciousness, is forward-looking; and an essential element in the phenomena is its lack of automatic mechanical accuracy, its liability to error.
The statement that a situation not in physical relations with an organism, not even in existence, influences that organism, is of course in a sense figurative; the influence is indirect, operating through a situation with which the organism is in contact at the moment. Hence, as already pointed out, it is always theoretically possible to ignore the form of the conscious relation, and interpret the reaction as a mechanical effect of the cause actually present.
But it remains true that practically we must regard the situation present to consciousness, not the one physically present, as the controlling cause. In spite of rash statements by over-ardent devotees of the new science of "behavior," it is preposterous to suppose that it will ever supersede psychology which is something very different or the theory of knowledge, what does a producer mean in a food chain something like their historic forms.
It is evident that the possibility of a situation not present, operating through one which is present, is conditioned upon some sort of dependable relation between the two. This postulate of all knowledge and thought has been variously formulated as the "law" or "principle" of "causality," and "uniformity" or "regularity" of nature, etc. Remembering that we are speaking of the surface facts, not metaphysical interpretations, we may say that all reasoning rests on the principle of analogy.
We know the absent from the present, the future from the now, by assuming that connections or associations among phenomena which have been valid will be so; we judge the future by the past. Experience has taught us that certain time and space relations subsist among phenomena in a degree to be depended upon. This dogma of uniformity of coexistence and sequence among phenomena is a fairly satisfactory statement of the postulate of thought and forward-looking action from the standpoint of the philosopher.
But from the more superficial standpoint of common sense and hence of an inquiry such as the present the term "phenomenon" is rather vague and elusive, and a more serviceable formulation seems possible. Common sense works in terms of a world of objects or merely "things. This may be unsatisfactory to the philosopher, who will protest at once that the thing is merely a sum of its modes of behavior, that no such separation is really possible. It is the tthe riddle which so puzzled Locke, of the attribute and substratum, the substratum, of course, tending to evaporate under critical scrutiny.
But this weakness may prove rather a source of strength for the use which we intend to make of the notion, as will be argued. We have, then, our dogma which is the presupposition of knowledge, in this form; that the world is made up of things, which, under the same circumstances, always behave in the same way. The practical problem of inference or prediction in any particular situation centers around the first two of these three factors: what things are we dealing with, and what are the circumstances which condition their action?
From knowledge of these two sets of facts it must be possible whar say what behavior is to be expected. The chief logical problem, as already noticed, lies in the conception of a "thing. The assumption that under the same circumstances the same things sconomics in the same ways thus raises the single question of how far and in what sense the universe is really made up of such "things" which preserve an unvarying identity mode of behavior.
It is manifest that the ordinary objects of experience do not fit this description closely, certainly not such "things" as men and animals and probably not even rocks and planets in the strict sense. Science has rested upon the further assumption that this superficial divergence of fact from theory arises because the "things" of everyday experience are not the "ultimate" things, but are complexes of things which really are unchanging.
And the progress of science has consisted mostly in analyzing variable complexes into unvarying constituents, until now we have with us the electron. But workable knowledge of the world requires much more than the assumption that the world is made up of units which maintain an unvarying identity in time.
There are far too many objects to be dealt with by a finite intelligence, however unvarying they might be, if they were all different. We require the further dogma of identical similarity fasle large numbers of things. It must be possible not merely to assume that the same thing will always behave in the same way, but that the same kind of thing will do the same, and that there is in fact a finite, what is the fallacy of false cause in economics manageable number of kinds of things.
For our limited intelligence falwe deal with the world, it must be possible to infer from a perceived similarity in the behavior of objects to a similarity in respects not open to immediate observation. That is, we must assume that the properties of things are not shuffled and combined at random in nature, but that the number of groupings is limited or that there is constancy of association. This is the dogma of the "reality of classes," familiar to students of logic.
But even this is not enough.
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En esto algo es la idea excelente, es conforme con Ud.
Esta idea excelente tiene que justamente a propГіsito
maravillosamente, es la informaciГіn de valor
Felicito, me parece esto el pensamiento magnГfico
Realmente y como no he adivinado antes
Felicito, esta idea brillante tiene que justamente a propГіsito