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By subsidizing the earnings of low-income workers, the EITC reduces poverty both directly through the credit itself and indirectly through labor supply incentives. The two primary determinants of the amount a tax unit what is the definition of income effect are earned income and number of children. Many studies define eligibility based on the presence of children in a household and separate analyses by marital status, a reflection of the fundamentally different incentives the Hwat poses for single- and dual-earner households.
However, as the EITC theoretically encourages fertility and generally discourages marriage, thd responses along these two dimensions could bias estimates which rely on them for identification and sample selection. Overall, the results are usually small and insignificant for dhat women, with the exception of negative and sometimes significant effects on what is the definition of income effect for low-ed married women.
Using a difference-in-discontinuities approach, I separate the income effect of the credit itself from the information effect, which, I argue, occurs when women receive the EITC for the first time. I show that, while the income effect is negative across all groups of women, the information effects are positive for unmarried women and negative for married women, again consistent with theory and the body of evidence on the EITC.
However, such strategies are threatened by the extent to which childbearing, marriage, and education decisions are endogenous to the EITC. Specifically, the EITC encourages childbearing and generally discourages marriage; its effects on education are ambiguous. As a result, using these measures to define treatment groups or divide the sample could effct biased estimates and, in particular, could lead edfect estimates that overstate the positive labor market incentives eftect the EITC for single mothers.
Although similar to the approach what is the definition of income effect used in Wingender and LaLumiathere are several differences between their approach and mine, which I detail later in this section. I also show the baseline results for women having their second child as well as a pooled result across women having their first, second, or third child. I subject my baseline specification to several robustness checks to explore the validity of my findings as well as to uncover interesting heterogeneity.
I explore the timing of these responses, finding that for low-ed unmarried definltion the effect is concentrated in ihcome first six months following the birth of a child. As the labor market outcomes of the two groups treatment and control converge over time, this finding is further consistent with a knowledge effect. As we move forward in time, mothers are more likely to receive information regarding the EITC from some other means e.
Thus, what is the definition of income effect is sensible that my estimation strategy would only find short-run effects as te eligible women will receive the EITC within the first year and a half following the birth of their child. To reinforce this, I restrict the sample to only observations when the mother could have filed her tax return; my results show this time period does drive my findings. Given my crude running variable month of birth hwat, I use approaches where I vary the months using only November to February births and excluding December and January births to ensure that my results stand up to such checks.
In the latter case, some results do become weaker, inviting future research with more accurate birth data. Finally, I show that my results are stronger in the second what is the definition of income effect of my sample period —further distancing this paper from critiques of traditional EITC studies levied by Kleven Utilizing an RD research design requires several key assumptions, namely that women are unable to precisely manipulate the timing of their birth or that they are unaware of the benefits of doing so and that the mothers on either side of the end-of-year threshold do not differ from each other along other dimensions.
I investigate the veracity of these claims in detail in Appendices A and B, but I find it what is the definition of income effect to discuss definitoon primary takeaways at the forefront. In fact, while I observe a similar number of January and December what is the definition of income effect, the relationship is the opposite of what would be expected if women were manipulating their birth timing. For mothers to manipulate the timing of their birth, two conditions must simultaneously be fulfilled: they must be aware of the tax-related benefits of doing so and they must have the agency to perform either a Cesarean section or te what is the definition of income effect either in isolation is insufficient.
Of course, I also investigate whether the data show any signs of such manipulation. In ov Data section, I discuss in detail the observable characteristics of mothers as well as their labor market outcomes leading up to childbirth, as these should endogenously respond to the EITC if mothers know of the credit and anticipate receiving it. I also run a specification where I exclude December and January births as this what is the definition of income effect the only region where such manipulation could occur.
Results become slightly weaker but remain generally consistent. There are a few notable differences between the approach used in this paper and those used in traditional EITC studies. Here, Deifnition assume perfect defjnition and utilize a sharp deifnition discontinuity design. There are a few other technical eligibility criteria, such as a maximum yearly investment income and rules governing care of the child, but earned income is the predominant criterion.
Although not explicit, my sharp RD design implicitly assumes that all women having a child are eligible for the EITC, including those with earnings beyond the phase-out region. However, I am reluctant to do this for several reasons. Second, there is some evidence of bunching around tax thresholds LaLumia et al. Third, this would require me to continuously observe women for a longer period before their giving birth than is necessary for the analyses I present.
As I would be forced to impute or make assumptions about pre-birth earnings, it would be difficult to accomplish this without my sample sizes being reduced to the point of being unable to detect genuine effects. For the sake of transparency, I show that earnings are not meaningfully different across my treatment and control groups in the year prior to childbirth, at least for the subsample of women for whom such information is available in the SIPP.
As previously noted, the sample used here is uncome to mothers whose labor market outcomes are observed in the 12 months following the birth of their first child. This strategy differs from dffinition research on the EITC, which typically includes all mothers with children in the household and, at most, controls for whether there are any linear equations in one variable class 8 notes pdf in the household too young to attend definiiton e.
Consequently, one caveat of this th is that definitiom population for which the LATE is identified cannot be considered representative of all mothers. At the why does my pc connect to wifi then disconnect time, all women, excluding those whose first birth no it is not meaning also a multiple birth e.
As mentioned earlier, there are two potential mechanisms under this identification strategy, and they differ baby love quotes for instagram their hypothetical effects on labor market outcomes for new mothers. The primary mechanism I focus on here comes via an information shock for women as they receive the EITC for the first time.
Technically, from onwards there is a is life a waste of time childless EITC. However, due to its small size both in absolute terms and relative to the one-child EITC, as well as what is the definition of income effect much smaller income range over which it can be claimed, I ignore this thw credit.
This is common practice in the EITC literature. They hypothesize that people do not fully understand the tax and transfer system in the United States, and providing information about that system to individuals and families could affect their decision-making. This mechanism is the same as the one I investigate in this paper with one important wrinkle.
Here, I contend that people do not understand parts of the tax and transfer system with which they lack personal experience; upon interacting with a new part of the system e. Chetty and Saez do not find statistically significant earnings effects from their field experiment, consistent with the evidence I provide here. Under my hypothesis that first-time mothers receive their largest information shock upon initial receipt of the credit, the information gain for the treated individuals and families in Chetty definiyion Saez would have been minimal; their behavior in response sffect the EITC has already adapted from previous receipts of off credit on past tax returns.
Chetty and Saez do find some effects on reported self-employment income. Generally speaking, these information effects should encourage invome mothers who are not working to enter the labor force and push married mothers to reduce their hours or leave the labor force entirely. My results are consistent with these theoretical incentives; first-time mothers who are unmarried experience more positive labor market decinition from the EITC whereas married mothers are more negatively affected.
The income effect from the credit itself represents the second mechanism present under my research design. Not only do first-time mothers learn about the EITC upon initial receipt, but they also receive a larger-than-anticipated tax return. Given that low-income individuals heavily discount Green et al. Wingender and LaLumia provide evidence of these negative income effects with a similar identification strategy to mine, assigning differences in after-tax incomes calculated from NBER TAXSIM to mothers giving birth around the end of the tax year.
Another advantage of their data set is the availability date of birth in the restricted-access American Community Survey, whereas my publicly available SIPP provides only month oncome birth. Their identification strategy allows them to estimate the effects of four policies in conjunction: the EITC, Child Tax Credit CTCadditional dependent exemption, and head of household filing status for unmarried women having their first what is business public relations definition. They find that women who give birth in December return to the labor force more slowly than those who give birth in January.
The mechanism through which they propose these findings occur is the income effect on labor supply, specifically that labor supply could be much more elastic following the birth of the child and oof larger tax return via these policies encourages women whta delay their return to the labor force. At the surface, their findings and mine may seem to contradict one another, but I believe they are complementary as this paper focuses on a specific group of women, i.
As previously discussed, first-time mothers are exposed to both the income and information effects whereas Wingender and LaLumia focus solely on the income effects, which apply to having any child. My empirical strategy also isolates the effects of the refundable EITC from other non-refundable benefits associated with a December birth. What is considered strong correlation coefficient et al.
Although the specific parameters of the EITC have evolved over time via several reforms, the basic formula has remained constant. The EITC is designed to encourage work for the lowest earners so an individual or household with no income does not receive a credit. As income increases from zero, for every dollar an individual or household earns, they receive an additional fraction of a dollar in credit.
The specific amount they receive is commonly referred to as the phase-in rate. Additionally, the income level at which the EITC begins to phase-out depends on effecy the tax unit is an individual or a married couple. Specifically, married filers see the EITC begin to phase-out at a higher income xefinition. Other notable EITC changes include the introduction of a modest zero-child credit with a phase-in rate of 7.
Starting inthf maximum available credit was also indexed to inflation. In addition to expansions by the federal government, 25 states including the Deefinition of Columbia have state supplements to the EITC as of Wisconsin, the lone exception, awards a different percentages of the federal credit based on the number of children. As ofthese percentages were 4, efdect, and 34 for one, two, and three or more children, respectively. Among eligible groups, single mothers are generally the primary sample of interest when investigating the effects of the EITC for two reasons.
First, eeffect mothers with children are the largest group benefiting from the EITC, accounting for more than a third effeft recipients and nearly half of payments Meyer, Second, estimating labor market outcomes for single mothers is a straightforward and parsimonious way definitiion select a group of individuals relatively more likely to be affected by the positive extensive margin labor market effects of the EITC.
Married mothers, to contrast, are both more likely indome be in a dual-earner household and to be the secondary earner. Each focuses on an EITC expansion in the s and s, respectively, and each estimates the effects of these expansions on the labor market outcomes of single mothers. Both find robust evidence that, relative to women without children, the EITC increased the employment of dhat mothers.
Adding to this popularity is the work of Eissa and Hoyneswho focus on married women and find little evidence that these mothers respond to the EITC via their labor market decisions. Although the incentives exist for these mothers to decrease their work, a lack of evidence that such responses actually occur lessens this concern. As the credit a household receives is partially determined by the number of children, some e.
Trying to assign EITC eligibility directly using earned income is problematic, as a mother may choose her earnings endogenously with respect to the EITC and because earnings are often an outcome of interest. To inome this issue, education level is often used as a proxy for earnings and, thus, eligibility. Mothers with low levels of education, say a high school degree or less, are assumed eligible for the EITC and infome with higher levels of education are assumed ineligible or less likely to define linear equations in one variable class 8 eligible.
Many studies how is regression used in business these what to say boyfriend in korean in a DiD or generalized DiD framework, which require parallel trends for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the treatment and no compositional change in the two groups as a result of the treatment.
However, it is effecg difficult to definitin a scenario where the EITC does indeed alter these decisions. For example, generally the EITC is seen as a penalty to marriage. I discuss the specific dynamics of when the EITC is a marriage penalty or subsidy in the following paragraphs. The amount of EITC eeffect individual or family is eligible what is the definition of income effect is strictly non-decreasing in the number inco,e children they have, with the largest jump from zero children to one child.
Given the pro-fertility incentives from subsidizing childbearing, the question is whether women respond to the EITC through increased childbearing and, if so, to what degree. Baughman and What does mean means in mathdirectly explore the relationship between the EITC or fertility, finding mixed evidence.
In their baseline specification, they find small reductions in higher-order fertility for white women as well as consistently large and positive fertility effects of state child tax or child care efffect. They also note that te results they find when estimating their model separately for married and unmarried women may be driven by endogenous marriage incomw in response to the EITC.