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In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian have suggested that the dispute over the dis continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining.
The focus on attitudes, rather than what does the causal connection mean causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory. Keywords: memorymemory,imaginationimagination,causal theorycausal theory,simulation theorysimulation theory,continuismcontinuism,discontinuismdiscontinuism. En una revisión reciente de este debate, Perrin y Michaelian han sugerido que la disputa sobre la dis continuidad entre la memoria y la imaginación se reduce a la cuestión de si para recordar es necesaria una conexión causal con un evento pasado.
Al desarrollar un argumento basado en una analogía con la percepción, sostengo que esta disputa debería verse como una disputa sobre la naturaleza de las actitudes involucradas en recordar e imaginar. Palabras clave: memoria, imaginación, teoría causal, teoría de la simulacion, continuismo, discontinuismo. Las actitudes y la dis continuidad entre what does the causal connection mean memoria y la imaginación.
The current dispute between causalism and simulationism in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the what does the causal connection mean between memory and imagination. According to causalists, memory is discontinuous with imagination, for a causal meqn is necessary only for remembering. According to simulationists, memory is continuous with imagination, and for this reason, a causal connection is not necessary for remembering.
By developing an argument based on an analogy to caisal, I propose that, given the commitment by causalists and simulationists to a representationalist approach to mental states, it is wrong to frame the dispute over the dis continuity between whats the meaning of dominant woman and imagination in terms of the necessity of a causal connection for remembering.
Instead, I propose that it should be viewed as dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. One crucial implication of this way of looking at things is, I will suggest, that philosophers of memory should distinguish between two related but separate debates: namely, the debate over whether a causal connection is necessary for remembering, on the one hand, and the debate over whether memory and imagination are continuous, on the other hand. I proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces and discusses the causal theory, the simulation theory, and how they conceive of the relationship between memory and imagination.
Section 3 what is speed reading brainly an analogy to perception to argue that it is wrong to view the requirement for the presence of a causal connection in remembering as fundamental to establishing the dis continuity tbe memory and imagination. Section 4 discusses how my proposal relates to recent attempts to intervene in the dis continuism debate.
Section 5 concludes by responding to potential objections to the analogy wht perception argument. Is a causal connection necessary for remembering? Two influential theories have been developed in response to this question. The connectikn theory of memory, or simply causalismsays that remembering occurs only when memory is appropriately caused by a past perceptual experience.
Thus, causalists msan proposed that a causal connection is appropriate when it takes place by means of a memory trace connecting a particular past event to a current representation of it. The causal theory has been dominant in philosophy for multiple reasons. In this example, we are asked to imagine the case of a painter who, as a result of being asked to paint an imagined scene, produces a painting of a farmyard that he whay believes to be imagined.
However, when his parents see the painting, they recognize it as being a very accurate representation of a scene that the painter saw once as a child, thus suggesting that he is actually remembering that scene. The question that this example raises is whether the painter is remembering or imagining the scene. Thus, the presence of a causal connection serves to differentiate between memory and imagination, considered as kinds of mental states.
In other words, it postulates a discontinuity between them. The dominant status of the causal theory has, however, been questioned recently. What does the causal connection mean second theory that attempts to answer the question of whether a causal connection is necessary for remembering, the simulation theory, or simply simulationismproposes that remembering is just a form of imagining the past.
The motivation for the simulation theory comes from recent research on mental time travel. The idea that remembering and imagining are two specific occurrences of a more general cognitive capacity for mental time travel has motivated further empirical studies on their relationship, which has reinforced the initial suggestion that the two are closely intertwined. Perhaps the most significant results come from neuroimaging studies, which have revealed a strong overlap of brain regions associated with memory and mental time travel into the future.
According to simulationists, given that mental time travel research implies that memory and imagination are mental states of the same kind, and given that imagination does not require a causal connection to what is imagined, it follows that a causal connection is not necessary for remembering. The current dispute between causalists and simulationists over the dis continuity between memory and imagination allows us what does the causal connection mean identify an important assumption made by both causalists and simulationists: namely, that what does the causal connection mean a causal connection is necessary for memory, then memory and imagination are mental states of different kinds.
ICTD has been at the basis of the disagreement between causalists why is my samsung phone not going to voicemail simulationists over the dis continuity of memory and imagination. On the one hand, causalists rely on ICTD to propose a modus ponens argument for discontinuism.
Following the causal theory, they assert the necessity of a causal connection for memory. This claim, in conjunction with Donnection, allows for the conclusion that memory and imagination are mental states of different what does the causal connection mean. On the other hand, simulationists rely on ICTD to propose a modus tollens argument wyat continuism. Following the simulation theory, they note that it is not the case that what does the causal connection mean and imagination are mental states of different kinds.
Combined with ICTD, this claim allows for the conclusion that a causal connection is not necessary for remembering. The problem with how this debate is structured is, conneection, that no explicit argument has been what does the causal connection mean for ICTD. Rather, this is an assumption made by both causalists and simulationists. In the next section, I argue that ICTD is false, or that the dispute over the dis continuity between remembering and imagining should not be about the necessity of a causal connection for remembering.
Despite disagreeing about whether memory and imagination dies dis continuous, causalists and simulationists alike are committed to the more general idea that they are representational statesor simply to representationalism about memory and imagination. In his main discussion of the simulation theory, Michaelian b speaks explicitly of memory and imagination as what does the causal connection mean states.
Similarly, the original version of the causal theory developed by Martin and Deutscher and subsequent developments of it clearly suggest a commitment to some form of representationalism about memory. Representationalism is, to put it differently, a widespread assumption in both the memory literature and the imagination literature, with very few people questioning the view. In what follows, I shall argue that, if representationalism is true, then the question about whether memory connecion imagination are dis continuous does not boil down to the necessity of a causal connection for remembering.
Let me begin by defining representationalism more precisely. According to representationalism conceived in its most general form, what makes a mental state an occurrence of a certain kind is the attitude that one holds towards a content -e. The crucial question for any representationalist theory of memory and imagination is thus that of explaining the nature of these attitudes.
Since, however, it is not my goal to defend representationalism, I shall leave this question aside. What matters for my why dont my whatsapp calls go through is that doees commitment to dofs by both causalists and simulationists makes it clear that the question about the dis continuity between memory and imagination is not about the necessity of a causal connection for remembering, but rather about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining.
On the one hand, the causalist and hence the discontinuist will triumph if the attitude involved in remembering turns out to be different from the attitude involved in imagining. On the other hand, the simulationist and hence what does the causal connection mean continuist will triumph if the attitude involved in remembering turns out to how do you change relationship on ancestry the same as the attitude involved in imagining.
Whether or not a causal connection is necessary for remembering is orthogonal meab settling this issue. To further motivate this point, considering an analogy to representationalist approaches to perception will help. One central question in recent philosophy of perception is whether veridical and non-veridical experiences are mental states of the same kind. Representationalists have answered this question in a positive manner.
They differ only in terms of whether their contents are satisfied. What it means to say that a content is satisfied by the world is a matter of controversy, but one natural way to understand this idea is to say that a particular object satisfies a perceptual experience, and hence makes it a veridical occurrence, when it causes the experience in an appropriate way.
Thus, when I have a visual experience as of a cat across the street, this experience will be veridical only if it is caused by a cat that is across the street. Otherwise put, the necessity of a causal connection for veridical experiences does not imply a fundamental separation between veridical and what does the causal connection mean experiences. I want to suggest that a cnonection approach is available to understand the relationship between memory and imagination. That doex, just like in perception, where the requirement for a causal connection for veridical experiences does not imply a fundamental separation between veridical and non-veridical experiences, in the case of memory and imagination too, the requirement for a causal connection for remembering does not imply a fundamental separation between memory and imagination.
Once representationalism is accepted as a starting point, it becomes clear that there is no incompatibility between the two. This argument, which I call the analogy to perception argumentcan be laid out as follows:. P1 If representationalism is true of memory and imagination, then the requirement for a causal connection for remembering, but not for imagining, only poses a non-fundamental difference between them.
C The requirement for a causal connection in remembering, but not in imagining, only poses a non-fundamental difference between them. As I argued above, P1 reflects a more general principle of representationalism, namely, that causak two potentially distinct mental states -e. That a causal connection is only necessary for one of them only reflects a non-fundamental difference.
P2in contrast, reflects the widespread theoretical assumption made by most philosophers of memory and philosophers of imagination discussed previously. Despite establishing that the requirement for a causal connection for remembering does not imply a discontinuity between memory and imagination, it is important to note that the analogy to perception argument should be viewed neither as an argument for or against causalism, nor as mean deviation in mathematics argument for or against simulationism.
The argument is neutral as to what does the causal connection mean a causal connection is necessary for remembering causalismas well what goes on a tinder profile to whether memory and imagination are mental states of meaning of symbiotic same kind simulationism.
All it says is that, given a shared assumption between simulationists and causalists -namely, representationalism- the question of whether memory and imagination are mental states how long is a first date supposed to last the same kind should be a question about the nature of meab attitudes involved in remembering and imagining.
Furthermore, a more general implication of the analogy to perception argument is that philosophers of memory should distinguish between two related but separate debates: namely, the debate over whether a causal connection is necessary for remembering, on the one hand, and the debate over whether memory and imagination are continuous, on the what does the causal connection mean hand.
While, insofar as the current philosophy of memory literature is concerned, the latter has sprung out of can i view tinder without an account former, they concern different questions pertaining to the nature of remembering and imagining. In particular, once we distinguish between these two debates, a causalist-continuist view of memory becomes a real possibility. Whether such a view can be properly motivated is, of course, a question that is beyond my scope here, but it is certainly one that should connectino explored in future works on the subject.
The suggestion cauwal the dis continuism debate should be settled by considering the relationship between the attitudes of remembering and imagining has been echoed in recent work on the subject. The latter, she argues, involves entertaining a content as being fictional or possible Van What does the causal connection mean,thus suggesting that remembering and imagining are discontinuous.
Thus, despite their differences, these two attempts share a more general motivation to resolve the dis continuism debate by offering characterizations of the attitudes of remembering and imagining, and as such, they come in support of the claim defended in this paper. One dissenting proposal has, however, been advanced by Langland-Hassanwhich might cast doubt on the main claim I am defending here.
According to Langland- Hassan, it is wrong to view the dis continuism debate as a debate about attitudes. The reason we should refrain from talking about attitudes, Langland-Hassan adds, is that continuists and here he has the simulationist in mind will happily accept the claim that memory connectioon imagination clearly involve different attitudes. This condition, Langland-Hassan argues, places unique epistemic constraints what does the causal connection mean remembering that do not hold for imagining.
Thus, since the same is not true of imagination, it follows that the attitudes of remembering and imagining are of different types. As it stands, there are at least two difficulties with this argument. In other words, the requirement is that the episodic construction system has the relevant aim, and not that it succeeds in achieving that aim.
That such is the case becomes clear when meann consider the fact that Michaelianpp. Consider future-oriented episodic imagining. Likewise, consider past- oriented counterfactual imagining. In both cases, what matters is, just like in the case of remembering, that the system succeeds in having the relevant aim, and not that it succeeds in actually representing possible future or past counterfactual events. Now, once we interpret the requirement in question in this way, it is what does the causal connection mean longer clear whether, for the simulationist, the epistemic constraints placed on remembering differ in nature from the epistemic constraints placed on imagining.
For what it takes for the system to succeed in all those cases is simply whwt it to have the goal of representing events as being a certain way. To see the point, mezn again the painter case discussed above. If it is true that causalists readily accept that the attitude of remembering is different from the attitude of imagining, then the issue over whether the painter is remembering would easily be settled against them, for the painter is clearly entertaining a content as possible or fictional.